Prior Cognitive Art

A prior is not explained by stacking more priors; it is located by mechanism, function, history, and fixed-point organization. The paper's precise thesis is procedural: before asking why
a prior exists, identify which explanatory kind is being requested and name the
rule that will terminate the explanation. This working paper argues that Tinbergen's four questions
are not stacked levels in one causal chain. They are crossed axes: proximate
versus ultimate, and static versus developmental. Mechanism and function ask
what a prior is doing now; ontogeny and phylogeny ask how such organization came
to be across different timescales.

The paper treats the familiar "prior on a prior" problem in hierarchical Bayes
as structurally parallel to an ontogenetic account that says one prior selects
another. Both postpone the question unless they terminate. Three termination
families organize the paper: pragmatic closure, selection closure, and
fixed-point termination. They are organizing families, not an exhaustive
taxonomy of every possible explanation. A final upstream pass asks what comes
before the first prior and answers with a constraint stack -- viability,
allostasis, co-homeostasis, development, and niche support -- rather than with a
hidden meta-prior. The project uses plain text, deterministic conceptual visualizations, and one deterministic illustrative simulation trace.
Its supplement adds generated, auto-numbered formal claims and a closed symbol
glossary as text-integrity artifacts rather than empirical machinery.
The paper includes one deterministic illustrative simulation trace over authored formal states; it does not run stochastic simulations, synthetic-data experiments, empirical estimates, or performance benchmarks.

The "art" in the title names the craft at stake: arranging explanatory kinds
(proximate/ultimate, static/developmental, selection/fixed-point) so that no
single kind is mistaken for the whole, and rendering that arrangement as
deterministic figures and checkable formalism rather than as empirical simulation evidence. It
also marks a bounded link to aesthetic practice: artworks can stage encounters
with expectations, material affordances, ambiguity, and meaning, but this paper
treats that link as a conceptual analogy, not as an empirical theory of art.

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Associated artifacts
GitHub release: Prior Cognitive Art v0.1.0 (https://github.com/docxology/prior_cognitive_art/releases/tag/v0.1.0)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21316510
Zenodo: https://zenodo.org/records/21316510
PDF SHA-256: 62aa1d8d4af75f4b5bdc894516720bdf61ae68a4be27f44aefc09c2dd2fbba67

Overview source: Curated paper metadata.