{
  "title": "docxplus — the Intelligent Document Container",
  "version": "1.0.1",
  "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.21983948",
  "doi_url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21983948",
  "zenodo_record": "https://zenodo.org/records/21983948",
  "record_id": "21985580",
  "publication_date": "2026-08-17",
  "resource_type": {
    "title": "Software",
    "type": "software"
  },
  "creators": [
    {
      "name": "Friedman, Daniel Ari",
      "affiliation": "Active Inference Institute",
      "orcid": "0000-0001-6232-9096"
    }
  ],
  "description": "A standards-first reference implementation of a byte-valid OOXML .docx that also carries a modular, Ed25519-signed, AES-256-GCM-encrypted intelligence layer through spec-sanctioned side-channels, with an optional bridge to the docxology/steganographer signed-packet backend.",
  "keywords": [
    "OOXML",
    "DOCX",
    "Open Packaging Conventions",
    "steganography",
    "document security",
    "reproducible research"
  ],
  "files": [
    {
      "name": "docxplus-1.0.1.tar.gz",
      "size_bytes": 7731552,
      "checksum": "md5:d4b86e249abcfb4afae9fffe9ab68b41",
      "download_url": "https://zenodo.org/api/records/21985580/files/docxplus-1.0.1.tar.gz/content"
    },
    {
      "name": "docxplus-1.0.0.tar.gz",
      "size_bytes": 7711694,
      "checksum": "md5:c1f9b372e1611697fa64be068d5da45c",
      "download_url": "https://zenodo.org/api/records/21985580/files/docxplus-1.0.0.tar.gz/content"
    },
    {
      "name": "manuscript.pdf",
      "size_bytes": 3024717,
      "checksum": "md5:fbf21388af381ca737031f2750d9ed83",
      "download_url": "https://zenodo.org/api/records/21985580/files/manuscript.pdf/content"
    }
  ],
  "related_resources": [
    {
      "type": "repository",
      "url": "https://github.com/docxology/docxplus"
    }
  ],
  "github_repo": "docxology/docxplus",
  "source": "zenodo-only",
  "checked_at": "2026-09-24T18:29:58Z",
  "github_release_url": "https://github.com/docxology/docxplus/releases/tag/v1.0.1",
  "release_tag": "v1.0.1",
  "release_name": "docxplus v1.0.1",
  "pdf_sha256": "",
  "pairing_confidence": "strong",
  "pairing_evidence": [
    "github_release_mentions_doi",
    "github_repo_self_linked"
  ],
  "methods": [
    {
      "name": "Dual-contract design: OPC/ODF surface contract plus signed intelligence manifest",
      "description": "A single archive is both a conforming .docx/.odt and a carrier of typed payload modules indexed by an Ed25519-signed manifest.",
      "evidence": "an author can add, seal, or remove intelligence without ever risking the document’s openability, and a reader who has never heard of docxplus is never inconvenienced."
    },
    {
      "name": "Per-module sealing (Argon2id/Scrypt + AES-256-GCM, X25519, Shamir k-of-n, decoys)",
      "description": "Payloads are sealed individually rather than encrypting the whole package, with slot names bound as AES-GCM additional authenticated data.",
      "evidence": "The design turns on one decision: seal payloads, never the package."
    },
    {
      "name": "Five spec-sanctioned transport channels incl. LSB steganography",
      "description": "Implements custom XML parts, auxiliary package parts, custom document properties, MCE choice blocks, and LSB embedding in displayed images.",
      "evidence": "We implement and evaluate 5 spec-sanctioned transport channels: custom XML parts, auxiliary package parts, custom document properties, Markup Compatibility and Extensibility (MCE) choice blocks, and least-significant- bit steganography"
    },
    {
      "name": "Merkle-tree provenance with composite surface digest and transparency log",
      "description": "Signs a Merkle root over modules together with a digest of every part, content type and relationship; attestations go into a log anchored by a signed tree head.",
      "evidence": "provenance.py builds a Merkle tree (Merkle 1987) over the module digests, giving logarithmic inclusion proofs: a third party can confirm that one module belongs to the signed set without being shown the others."
    },
    {
      "name": "Mock-free test harness, project round-trip, chi-squared steganalysis and red-team review",
      "description": "Evaluated with 467 mock-free tests at a 90% coverage gate, an in-tree chi-squared LSB detector, a project round-trip harness, and 14 adversarial review cycles.",
      "evidence": "The harness comprises 467 test functions under a 90% coverage gate, with no mocks anywhere: tests run against real cryptographic primitives, real ZIP archives, real subprocess CLI invocations"
    }
  ],
  "key_findings": [
    "In the reference dossier, all 5 modules across all 4 sealing lineages extracted and verified, and the container passed OPC conformance.",
    "Carrying a 14-file, 9-directory project tree into both .docx and .odt containers, all 18 of 18 round-trip invariants held, with byte-identical packed payloads between profiles.",
    "The round-trip harness found that packing followed symbolic links, embedding link targets such as an SSH key; symlinks are now refused by default.",
    "The chi-squared detector flags fully embedded sealed (ciphertext) carriers but does not detect unsealed low-entropy payloads at any fill rate.",
    "Fourteen adversarial review cycles closed 88 confirmed findings, and a sample-pair analysis estimator was withdrawn after proving mis-scaled by roughly an order of magnitude."
  ],
  "key_findings_evidence": [
    "All 5 modules extract and verify: • Structure. The container passes OPC conformance ( opc_valid = True ): no part collisions, no broken relationship pointers.",
    "Over a 14-file, 9-directory tree, all 18 of 18 invariants hold.",
    "Path.is_file() follows symbolic links, so a tree containing creds -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa had the key’s contents packed into the document under the link’s name, with nothing in the manifest to suggest it.",
    "a fully embedded carrier reports 𝑝 ≈ 1 . An unsealed low-entropy payload is not detected at any fill rate",
    "the format has been through 14 cycles of adversarial review closing 88 confirmed findings."
  ],
  "summary_provenance": {
    "source": "full_text.md",
    "date": "2026-10-01",
    "work_kind": "software/methods",
    "method": "Evidence-grounded extraction from full_text.md: every method and finding carries a verbatim quote from the paper text, mechanically verified to occur in full_text.md (whitespace/ligature-normalized) before merge.",
    "notes": "Specification + reference implementation paper; evaluation is software testing and adversarial review, not user study. Several quotes avoid 'ﬀ' ligature passages.",
    "reviewed": "2026-10-01 independent review of every item against its quote and context; no corrections needed"
  }
}
